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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BARRY WILLIAM BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 37686

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Baker failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
issuing a check without funds, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Baker Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Baker formulated a scheme to cash fraudulent payroll checks written on a closed
account in order to obtain money for illegal drugs. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Baker made the
checks out to 17-year-old J.D., who cashed one at Super 1 Foods in the amount of
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$414.84. (PSI, p.2.) J.D. was attempting to cash a second check in the same amount
when she was contacted by law enforcement. (PSI, p.2.) She advised officers that
Baker was paying her $40.00 to cash checks for him. (PSI, p.2.) Shortly thereafter,
officers stopped Baker and found several additional checks written to J.D. and to a
second female in Baker’s possession. (PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Baker with two counts of issuing a check without funds, with a
habitual offender enhancement. (R., pp.24-25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Baker
pled guilty to one count and the state dismissed the second count and the habitual
offender enhancement and agreed to recommend that Baker’s sentence run
concurrently with the sentence in a separate case, for which he was on probation. (R.,
p.47; Tr., p.13, L.22 – p.14, L.6; p.25, Ls.4-7.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, and ordered that it run
concurrently with the underlying sentence in the case for which Baker was on probation.
(R., pp.60-67.) Baker filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.74-75, 79-82.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence,
which the district court denied.

(R., p.70; Order denying Rule 35 motion

(Augmentation).)
Baker asserts that the district court abused its discretion by declining to retain
jurisdiction upon imposing his sentence, in light of his drug addiction, purported
remorse, willingness to seek treatment, “work skill,” and support from family and friends.
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Baker has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion
of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that
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discretion. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).
The primary purpose of a district court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to
obtain additional information regarding whether the defendant has sufficient
rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677,
115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).

Probation is the ultimate goal of retained

jurisdiction. Id. There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient
evidence before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for
probation. Id. Contrary to Baker’s assertions on appeal, the record supports the district
court’s determination that Baker was not a suitable candidate for probation.
Baker’s extensive criminal record alone justifies his incarceration. His criminal
history dates back to 1983 and includes a withheld judgment for a DUI, three DUI
convictions, theft, public drunkenness, possession of a controlled substance,
possession of methamphetamine, and a military Court Martial and dishonorable
discharge for absence without leave, possession of drug paraphernalia, false official
statement, possession/use of cocaine, larceny, and soliciting sodomy. (PSI, pp.3-6.)
Baker pled guilty to all charges at the military Court Martial and was sentenced to 36
months of confinement in the brig. (PSI, pp.5, 7.) Following his release, he promptly
began committing DUI’s. (PSI, p.5.) Subsequent to his arrest for “writing fraudulent
checks and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia in January 2003,” Baker spent
nearly two years in the Kootenai County Drug Court program, which included a 12month inpatient treatment program. (PSI, pp.7, 16.) He “nearly reached graduation” on
two occasions, but “again began using drugs and committed additional crimes to
purchase the drugs.” (PSI, p.7.) Drug Court staff ultimately recommended that Baker’s
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sentence be imposed and “further determined that Mr. Baker would not benefit from any
treatment program outside of the prison community.” (PSI, p.7.) At sentencing for the
instant offense, the district court noted that Baker “had other checks to the same women
that were found on [him]. So this wasn’t a one time ill-conceived idea to get some
money.

This was going to be a pattern.”

(Tr., p.53, Ls.4-7.)

The presentence

investigator concluded:
The defendant’s action in the instant offense is a continuation of his
victimization towards members of society. The defendant’s criminal
history speaks for itself in the span of time and in the type and number of
criminal involvements. It reflects a wanton disregard for (or inability to
function within) societal norms and expectations. I feel that the defendant
is a threat to himself and the community. He needs long term treatment
and further programming to correct his criminal and addictive behaviors.
Therefore, I recommend he be sentenced to the Idaho Dept of Correction
for a period of time to be determined by the Court.
(PSI, p.19 (parenthesis original).) The sentence imposed was reasonable in light of
Baker’s ongoing criminal offending.
Baker has previously been afforded numerous rehabilitative opportunities. He
has participated in treatment through the Drug Court program, the Marine Corps,
residential treatment through the Port of Hope, Intensive Outpatient treatment, and
Relapse Prevention. (PSI, p.16.) He completed the retained jurisdiction program in
2004, and again following his conviction for possession of methamphetamine in 2009.
(PSI, pp.6-7.)

Despite his history of legal sanctions and copious treatment

opportunities, Baker resumed his substance abuse and committed the instant offense
less than five months after completing the retained jurisdiction program and being
placed on probation for his prior felony conviction. (PSI, p.17.) Baker’s probation officer
reported that Baker “‘was cashing the checks to get drugs and prostitutes,’” and stated,
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“‘The fact that he was using underage teenagers to cash the checks is a huge concern.
... He tries to manipulate people. In my opinion he is a threat to the community who
needs to be in prison.’” (PSI, p.8.) The state argued, “In Idaho alone he’s served two
retained jurisdictions. ... [H]e’s done literally years of every kind of rehabilitative
programing [sic] we have really short of sending him to prison and none of that has
worked” (Tr., p.46, L.21 – p.47, L.14), and:
So, I mean, there’s a year’s long record here. When he gets a
chance he blows it. He gets another chance, he blows it. And all along
the way there’s more victims. And I think we’re at the time where the
pattern just has to stop.
All kinds of other options have been tried. We’re at the end of the
road for Mr. Baker, not the beginning of the road. And it’s simply time to
just send him to prison.
(Tr., p.48, Ls.9-17). The district court reviewed Baker’s criminal history and stated,
“When I start adding all of those up together, your insistence on the abuse of
substances whether it be alcohol or methamphetamine puts people at significant risk
either of great bodily harm or death at the least and stealing of their property.” (Tr.,
p.54, Ls.8-12.) The sentence imposed was appropriate in light of Baker’s failure to
rehabilitate and the risk he presents to the community.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that a third period of retained jurisdiction was not appropriate, noting that,
while Baker “did a great job” during his last period of retained jurisdiction, his “behaviors
weren’t changed at all. So it’s time to use the term sentence.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.12-14.)
Nothing about Baker’s ongoing pattern of substance abuse, criminal conduct, refusal to
abide by the conditions of probation, and failure to rehabilitate demonstrates that he
would be an appropriate candidate for probation following a third period of retained
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jurisdiction.

Baker has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion in the

district court’s decision to impose his sentence without retaining jurisdiction.
Baker next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Baker must “show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Baker has failed to satisfy his burden.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Baker stated that the retained jurisdiction
program was, in the future, going to be extended to a year-long program. (Augmented
Tr., p.4, Ls.3-12.)

Baker has already had the benefit of a year-long residential

substance abuse program and two six-month periods of retained jurisdiction.

(PSI,

pp.7, 16.) As noted by the district court, Baker’s behaviors “weren’t changed at all.”
(Tr., p.55, Ls.12-13.) He continued to abuse drugs and victimized the community with
his fraudulent check scheme.

The penitentiary’s long-term treatment program is

appropriate, due to the severity of Baker’s substance abuse and his multiple failed
attempts to rehabilitate in the community.

In denying Baker’s Rule 35 motion, the

district court stated:
I’m exercising that discretion based on the really the outline that the
prosecutor gave the Court at the time of the last sentencing having
consideration whether to retain jurisdiction or whether to simply impose
the sentence. And it was the Court’s determination at that time that Mr.
Baker’s history of crimes and the current crimes that he was before the
Court on and the circumstances under which these crimes were
committed were all circumstances and factors that really supported a
prison sentence and supported Mr. Baker being able to make application

6

to the Parole Board for release to the community, rather than for this court
to continue to retain jurisdiction over the case and the matter to be
continuing in the District Court.
There does come a time in an individual’s history where the District
Court or the trial court simply needs to give up jurisdiction over the case
and leave it with the proper Board of Corrections and the Parole Board.
And this is one of those cases.
(Augmented Tr., p.7, L.10 – p.8, L.3.) The district court’s decision to deny Baker’s Rule
35 request was appropriate in light of Baker’s ongoing substance abuse, criminal
offending, unwillingness to abide by the conditions of community supervision, and
failure to rehabilitate despite numerous prior treatment opportunities.

Given any

reasonable view of the facts, Baker has failed to establish the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Baker’s conviction and
sentence and the district court’s order denying Baker’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2011.

/s/______________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of February, 2011, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/______________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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